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NIKLAS LUHMANN ON THE WELFARE STATE AND ITS LAW
by Gianfranco Poggi (University of Edingburgh)
Introduction
This paper is intended exclusively as an elementary, summary 
presentation of its topic. On two grounds do I consider such a 
modest task worth performing. In the first place, although 
this situation is now rapidly changing (1), Luhmann is far less 
known to students who read only English than to those who can 
read German (or Italian); besides, few of his writings in 
English expound his sociology of law (2), and none (as far I 
know) address directly and at length the specific theme of this 
paper. In the second place, Luhmann is a complex and demanding 
writer, and those not yet familiar with him can probably be 
helped, in making their first acquaintance, by the kind of 
introduction attempted here (3).
I
This first section of the paper deals exclusively with a single 
text, Politische Theorie im Wohlfahrtsstaat (Luhmann, 1981a) 
a short book written by Luhmann, I believe, at the behest of a 
German political party, and thus addressed originally to a 




























































































text dispenses with any extensive description of the welfare 
state phenomenon. Luhmann does say that the phenomenon amounts 
to more than what Italians refer to as the "stato
assistenziale" - a complex of public operations intended to 
relieve the economic disadvantage of underprivileged groups - 
but he is unfortunately unclear as to what else it amounts to. 
In particular, it is not clear whether the imagery of the 
welfare state adopted throughout the book does or does not 
comprise various forms of public intervention in the management 
of the national economy, from the support of aggregate demand 
to the financing of corporate Research and Development 
expenditures - forms which, according to some writers, 
constitute something like "welfare for the rich", insofar as 
they contribute to capital accumulation. (The omission of any 
explicit consideration of such state activities matches 
Luhmann's total, contemptuous lack of attention to marxist 
views of the welfare state, some of which emphasise precisely 
those activities).
Against the background, then, of an inadequate descriptive 
treatment of the welfare state, Luhmann proceeds to the much 
more congenial task of a theoretical treatment of it. 
Essentially, within the societies in which the welfare state 
operates, he seeks to identify a "principle" - a broad 
developmental tendency under whose logic those operations 
themselves might be meaningfully subsumed. In the light of 
this criterion, he discards proposals advanced by others: 




























































































of social disadvantage appear to him capable of bearing the 
conceptual weight required. He accords greater significance to 
a further principle, that of compensation; but essentially his 
own argument advances an alternative solution, according to 
which it is the principle of inclusion that makes the best 
conceptual sense of the development of the welfare state (4).
In order to realise what Luhmann means by "inclusion" we must 
consider, however briefly, his treatment of a wider problem, 
utterly central to his whole theoretical enterprise (5); the 
problem of the distinctive nature of modern society. For quite 
a few years now, Luhmann has addressed that problem chiefly by 
conceptualising an evolutionary sequence in the arrangements 
whereby broader, more comprehensive social systems (= 
societies) are on the one hand differentiated into narrower 
subsytems, and on the other sustain their own identity through 
those subsystems' operations.
First in this sequence (see for instance Luhmann, 1982:242 ff.) 
come societies characterised by segmentary differentiation: 
here the subsystems are very similar to one another and largely 
self-sufficient; they only make up a broader, societal system 
insofar as they share a cultural patrimony; metaphorically, we 
might say that such ("primitive") societies are integrated by 
virtue of possessing a centre. The next step in the sequence 
(hierarchical differentiation) concerns societies whose 
characteristic subsystems are corporate bodies standing in 




























































































where the superordinate bodies impose their own dominance over 
the subordinate ones; metaphorically, such stratified 
societies may be said to be integrated by virtue of having a 
summit. In the final arrangement, characteristic of modern 
societies (functional differentiation) the key subsystems are 
no longer "lived-in", "manned", relatively concrete social 
entities, but much more abstract ones: they consist of sets of 
differentiated, specialised resources and activities 
(political, economic, religious, legal, etc.) each of which 
presuppose the operation of the others and concurs through its 
own to the functioning of the whole. Such a society cannot be 
said, even metaphorically, to possess either centre or summit; 
it represents a distinctive "evolutionary advance" because of 
its capacity to generate and to make use of much greater 
complexity than societies characterised by the two earlier 
patterns of differentiation/integration.
Functional differentiation deeply alters the relationship 
between individuals and differentiated subsystems (and, through 
them, the larger society). Under premodern conditions, as we 
have seen, those subsystems (both the isolated, local 
communities of "primitive" societies; and the strata 
constituting more advanced ones) were units in which 
individuals lived out their concrete existence and from which 
they unproblematically derived their identities. The 
subsystems of modern societies are, as I have said, abstract 
entities: their own components are not individuals as such,




























































































existence of individuals, who are involved in those subsystems 
only with reference to specific capacities and concerns. This 
makes the modern relationship between individuals and the 
larger society particularly problematic, since the latter only 
exists through the operation of its functionally differentiated 
subsystems. The "inclusion principle", to which Luhmann 
chiefly refers for a theoretical understanding of the 
development of the welfare state, formulates the main tendency 
associated with the advance of modernity in shaping that 
relationship:
As an individual, man lives outside the functional 
systems. At the same time, each person must have access 
to each functional system, to the extent that the person 
cannot conduct his existence without addressing claims to 
societal functions. The inclusion principle formulates 
this requirement from the standpoint of the societal 
system (1981a:27f.)
Concretely, the principle's realisation is associated with the 
building up of the modern state and its evolving relationship 
to the population. At first that relationship concerns mainly 
the state's jurisdictional activity: individuals as such 
become vested with generalised legal capacities and all become 
justiciable of the state. Later, the expanding fiscal and 
legislative perogatives of the state are brought to bear on the 
population at large, and democratic participation rights are 




























































































the "encompassing of an ever-growing range of needs and 
interests of the population within the domain of possible 
political themes" (1981a: 28) through the building up of the 
welfare state which thus represents "the implementation of 
political inclusion" (1981a:28).
This is, however, a dynamic implementation, driven forward to 
ever new targets, as the welfare state secures the individual's 
access to more and more aspects and phases of the societal 
process. This dynamic tendency is interpreted by Luhmann in 
two ways. He connects it in the first place with a generic 
feature of social (and perhaps other) systems, which he labels 
as "self-reference":
The demand for welfare can refer always to itself and 
call itself "welfare". 'Welfare is of unlimited scope'. 
It possesses no end, can itself undertake the production 
of its own possibilities and of its own problems 
(1981a:36 f.).
In the second place, Luhmann connects this dynamic tendency to 
the changing pattern of internal differentiation of the 
functionally differentiated political system. In the early 
modern period that pattern was dualistic; it replicated at all 
levels from the system's top down to its base, the asymmetry 
characteristic of command/obedience relations between parts 
characterised at each level as respectively super- or 




























































































(which still holds in contemporary societies), is instead 
triadic. Here, the key differentiated subsystems of the 
political system are indeed three: the public, politics in the 
narrow sense (that is, the party system); administration (nota 
bene: this term to Luhmann denotes both legislative and 
governmental activities); and the (power) relations between 
these subsystems are not symmetric but circular. Power does 
not flow downwards but circulates backwards and forwards 
between those subsystems and, according to Luhmann, its 
movements trace two power circuits. Within one circuit, as 
conventional constitutional theory describes it, parliament (as 
the institutional seat of politics in the narrow sense) "makes 
laws and grants means for the pursuit of goals; the executive 
carries out programmes worked out through politics; the public 
abides by the decisions thus formed and in turn elects 
parliament". There is however a countercircuit, where
the administration puts preformed decisions in front of 
politics. Through party organisations, politics suggests 
to the public what it should vote for and why. In turn, 
the public influences the administration through channels 
as various as, on one hand interest groups and on the 
other, eople bursting into tears in public offices. 
(1981a:45 f.).
According to Luhmann, the welfare state's expansive tendencies 
rest particularly on this second counter-circuit, and




























































































present demand for state action regarding its needs) and the 
administration (with its potentially expandible capacity for 
intervention according to that demand).
The reader will have noted that so far my account (which 
closely follows Luhman's text) has made no mention of law. 
This is consistent with Luhmann's general view of modern 
society: for here law figures not as part of the political 
system, but as another differentiated societal subsystem, 
parallel with the political system itself, religion, education, 
the economy. Politische Theorie im Wohlfahrtsstaat introduces 
law through a rather tortuous argument, the elucidation of 
which calls for a brief reconsideration of twoo (overlapping) 
notions already mentioned: internal differentiation, and 
self-reference.
Each differentiated subsystem of a larger system becomes in 
turn differentiated and its tendency to self-reference takes 
the form of focussing much of its activity on the relations 
between its own differentiated (sub)subsystems, rather than on 
its own relations with the original larger system. Somewhat 
more concretely, this means that although the political system 
is a differentiated subsystem of society, most political 
activity tends to become concerned with internal political 
matters, and particularly with the contingencies of the power 





























































































This tendency, however, is counteracted at various points, 
corresponding to the interfaces between each pair within the 
triad of components we have mentioned, by "externalisations". 
This is to say that (so far as I understand Luhmann on this 
difficult point) the components of each pair are kept from 
becoming exclusively absorbed in their reciprocal relations by 
having to take account of the demands made by other societal 
subsystems, which in a sense remind them of the existence of a 
wider environment. In the present context, Luhmann introduces 
law as one such "externalisation device", affecting
specifically the public/administration interface. For while 
law itself, under modern conditions, is formed through 
legislation and thus "rests on the political system", yet 
"specific activities within the public/administration
relationship presuppose law as an external fact binding both 
sides" (1981a:64). The law's impact on that relationship is 
multiple; for instance, reference to law excludes public and 
administration from either colliding or colluding with one 
another solely in terms of their contrasting or converging 
interests and of the respective quantums of power. Law, more 
particularly, constrains administrative activity by requiring 
that equal cases should receive equal treatment; its existence 
makes it more likely that citizens will cooperate or comply 
with the administration's activities willingly (rather than 
under compulsion).
Further references to law are made in the context of a major




























































































limits of the welfare state". Once more, Luhmann attacks this 
theme by introducing a wider theoretical notion: the 
distinction between the function the political (sub)system 
performs for the societal system as a whole, and the specific 
performances demanded of it on behalf of the other (sub)systems 
- especially the economy, education, science, and the health 
system. Concretely, the political system is being asked to 
make provision for (some) requirements of all those other 
systems in the interest of (finally) increasing the 
population's welfare by guaranteeing the inclusion of more and 
more of its members among those benefitting from these systems' 
activities. However, the political system also remains bound 
to its specialised functional concern with "securing the 
execution of binding decisions" (Bereitstellung der 
Durchsetzungsfaehigkeit fuer bindende Entscheidungen) 
(1981a:82), by means of disposition over power and ultimately 
over physical coercion.
Now, according to Luhmann, this abiding concern of the state 
limits the extent to which it can reasonably be expected to 
deliver all of the performances expected of it by the other 
societal (sub)systems. For, as it seeks to meet the latter's 
demands, the state can only make recourse to two key "operative 
instrumentalities" (1981a: ch. XIII) which are compatible 
with the functional destination: it can allocate money - it 
can produce and arrange for the implementation of law. Money 
and law constitute, in this context of analysis, the two basic 




























































































political decisions can be secured.
Considered as such media, both money and law present 
considerable advantages. For instance, they are relatively 
easily deployable on the part of the political centre; they 
can be used to form lengthy chains of operation (as original 
allocations of money become a sequence of sub-allocations, and 
as broader legal directives become specified into narrower and 
narrower rulings); they can be used to build organisations, 
specialised agencies. However, there also are difficulties in 
the use of money and law as means (specifically) of the state's 
welfare activities. One may classify the most significant of 
these difficulties under the following three labels:
- disadvantages. The formation of laws and the allocation of 
moneys, when they constitute and are seen as the object of 
decisions, tend to enhance the sensitivity to changes both of 
those benefitting from and (critically) of those negatively 
affected by these decisions:
increases or decreases in available moneys, such as one 
would not normally notice become noticeable when effected 
through decisions; equally, changes in one's legal 
position which normally one would not observe are acutely 
perceived when enacted through decisions. (1981a:96).
Thus, both legal and financial provisions made in the context 
of welfare state activities tend to produce, at best, what




























































































- intrinsic limitations. There are "advanced" forms of welfare 
activity, particularly those labelled in the U.S.A. "people 
processing", that intend to induce or restore in their 
addressees a sense of personal worth, a capacity for autonomy 
and responsibility, whose beneficial effects simply cannot be 
secured (at any rate directly) through either legal or 
financial provisons:
Activities in this realm require resources of commitment, 
personal involvment, interactional sensibility, which law 
and money cannot provide for ... The conditions for 
success or failure, here rest on the individuals themselves 
and their interaction systems: these cannot be controlled 
from the centre or reduced to legal obligations ... (... 
What cannot be accomplished by means of either law or money 
is the modification of the people themselves) (1981a:97).
- cost. This difficulty must be understood, broadly, as the 
probability that the extensive recourse by the state to money 
allocations and legal provisions may overload, respectively, a 
society's economic system and its legal system:
In both domains, it should not be forgotten that ultimately 
the conditions of the possibility of these 
instrumentalities must be guaranteed outside the political 
system, and that this limits their availability to that 
system (1981a:99).




























































































tendency - labelled in Germany Verrechtlichung (which is 
translated - clumsily - as 'juridification') to legally 
discipline relationships and processes which in the past have 
dispensed with such discipline.
The welfare state may seek to evade or moderate the 
difficulties listed above, and pertaining to the direct 
employment of money and law as media of communication, by the 
strategy of using them indirectly to establish and finance 
administrative agencies which will in turn engage in 
non-financial and non-legal forms of intervention (for 
instance, through professional "caring" activities). But this 
strategy has its own pitfalls. In the first place, it 
unavoidably involves the further expansion of the state's 
administrative apparatus, with all the attendant bureaucratic 
pathologies. Furthermore, sometimes the agencies themselves, 
even when staffed by appropriately qualified personnel, run up 
against the same difficulty as the state's direct use of law 
and money (and particularly those labelled above "intrinsic 
limitations"). Finally, it often leads to the agency-building 
efforts being mistaken for indications of the agencies' 
effective incidence upon the "welfare problems" entrusted to 
them.
These liabilities of the state's most distinctive "operational 
instrumentalities", when deployed in the context of an expanded 
and expansive conception of welfare (together with other 




























































































adopting instead a more restrictive conception. The argument
developed to this effect in Politische Theorie____im
Wohlfahrtsstaat is interesting in its own right; but for the 
purposes of the present topic this bok has no more to offer; 
we we shall take our leave of it at this point, and look for 
other relevant texts.
II
It may be seen from the above account that Politische Theorie 
does indeed deal with law, but in a rather undifferentiated 
fashion, without any close analysis of the specific legal 
phenomena involved in or affected by the state's welfare 
activities. I know of no further texts of Luhmann's which 
engage expressly and at length in such an analysis. But there 
are a few which raise, incidentally to other topics, the 
question of "law in the welfare state".
The most important of these is a lengthy essay (Luhmann, 
1981c;ch. 2) in which where Luhmann, building upon two earlier 
essays (Luhmann, 1969, Luhmann 1970a; now reprinted in Luhmann 
1981b: 273 ff, 360 ff.), discusses "Subjective rights: the 
reconstruction of juridical consciousness on behalf of modern 
society". Once more (as the title suggests) the essay's 
broader topic is the nature of modern society. Specifically, 
it investigates one major legal development connected with the 




























































































with the associated increased significance of "self-reference" 
as a mechanism for the production of social and cultural 
reality. That is: in the same way that in Descartes's cogito 
the subject's reference to himself becomes the ground of 
cognitive certainty, in the legal sphere subjectively becomes 
the ground of a distinctively modern phenomenon - subjective 
rights (Luhmann quotes Saleilles's je veux, done j'ai des 
droits).
The modernity of the notion of subjective rights appears if we 
contrast it with the premodern notion of jus which it replaces. 
Jus entailed not only the complementarity of juridically 
protected expectations (i.e.: to the rights of one side 
correspond the obligations of the other) but also reciprocity 
(i.e.: there are rights and obligations in capo a both sides, 
though rarely an equivalence in the balance of rights over 
obligations on each side). However, the modern notion of 
subjective rights settles for complementarity: each subject 
may hold protected expectations via-a-vis others which are not 
directly connected or commensurate with the former’s 
obligations toward the latter. These, furthermore, are mostly 
called upon simply to register rather than act upon a given 
subject's rights.
Thus substracted from a concrete context of mutual obligations, 
juridically protected expectations become more mobile and 
fluid; they can be more freely generated, more variously 




























































































subjects holding them. One might say that subjective rights 
stand to jus as money exchange stands to barter: they 
presuppose and sustain a much more complex and flexible 
universe of expectations and potentialities. Not being 
counterbalanced by reciprocities, they also allow much greater 
asymmetries to build up in their actual enjoyment among 
subjects. The control over protected expectations, in turn, 
becomes much more abstract, detached, and general as, with the 
progressive modernisation of law, it comes to rest more and 
more upon enacted laws of the state and the latter's monopoly 
of legitimate enforcement. On the other hand, it is precisely 
the fastening upon subjects-as-such (as loci of 
self-referential processes) of entitlements in the form of 
rights that diminishes some risks attendant upon the 
positivisation of law.
What then - one may ask - is the connection between this legal 
development and the welfare state? That connection is complex 
and, so to speak, ambivalent. To begin with, subjective rights 
can be seen as ways of securing the "inclusion principle" 
which, as we have seen, Luhmann sees as central to the welfare 
state phenomenon. "Subjective right symbolises man outside the 
differentiated systems with his claims to inclusion" 
(1981c:98). More precisely, (developing an insight first 
developed by Simmel): Luhmann says that under modern 
conditions each individual becomes more loosely connected with




























































































the inclusion of the population in the societal system 
must be brought about in new forms. And since at first 
this aspiration cannot yet be realised, it becomes vested 
in the form of subjective rights. The fact that one is 
dealing with subjective rights (rather than sheer 
reflections of an objective legal order) symbolises that 
individuals are now seen as more strongly individualised 
and more independent of specific social connections. The 
fact that one is dealing with subjective rights (rather 
than obligations and responsibilities) symbolises that 
the inclusion of every individual in all functional 
domains is still an unfulfilled aspiration (1981c:84 f.).
Thus, the welfare state realises its programme "largely by 
means of an immense number of newly created subjective rights, 
transforming into entitlements not all but many social 
performances" (Leistungen) . This development is compatible 
with the principle of functional differentiation, for it does 
not closely connect reciprocities with rights (Luhmann 
criticizes the famous formulation of the Weimar constitution, 
Eigentum verpflichtet, as an anachronistic attempt to make such 
a connection). Rather, subjective right remains "a matter of 
subjective arbitrium, founded upon itself and presupposing on 
the part of others only the complementary registering" 
(Erleben) of one's entitlements (1981c:89).
However - unlike the paradigmatic subjective right, property 




























































































welfare state tends to become "hedged in by multiple 
regulations" (1981c:88), to the point where the determination 
of the concrete significance of the right is no longer vested 
in its holder but in the state itself as the right's addressee, 
which formulates the conditions for the realisation of the 
right in the context of its own operations and requirements.
In the long run, this leads to a veritable inversion of the 
relationship between "acting" and "registering" which was 
typical of earlier, "non-welfare" rights. There, most of the 
acting, if any was the business of the right-holder and other 
parties merely registered it. The typical welfare right, 
however, shifts the locus of action toward the state, putting 
the right-holder into the position of a claimant for the 
benefit of the state's action, or even just its passive 
recipient. Thus, while originally subjective rights had served 
to decentralise the production of legal phenomena and acted as 
a counterweight to positive law, welfare subjective rights 
become themselves "an instrumentality of positive law" 
(1981c:88). Furthermore, the very idea of subjectivity as a 
self-referential quality of the individual on which his/her 
right was grounded becomes attenuated, as the individual comes 
to be seen as the titular of interests rather than as the locus 
of subjectivity.
This last development contaminates the general notion of 





























































































Recent private law doctrine characterises subjective 
rights as the 'assignment' (Zuweisung) of goods or 
opportunities, and thus thinks itself in agreement with 
the constitutional concept of person and the Wuerdegebot. 
But read your Kant, and you realise that the opposite is 
taking place. For, according to Kant, subjective rights 
do not 'assign' but merely 'secure' what pertains to the 
subject in and of himself (was dem Subjekt von sich aus 
zusteht). This 'in and of himself' has now been dropped, 
and replaced by the appeal to 'fundamental values' with 
which the legislator must comply while doing his 
'assigning' (1981c:91).
In other terms: law is no longer seen as acknowledging and 
protecting rights which possess an "inner side" of their own. 
Rather, it becomes the sole fount and ground of rights deprived 
of any such independent foundation. This development may 
entail a "threat to human freedom", and by untying legal 
development from any presuppositions allows it to "go on 
growing out of control" (1981c:92).
Ill
The previous section dealt with legal developments associated 
with the welfare state which affect individual entitlements. 
One might expect Luhmann to complement his consideration of 




























































































of the activation and control of state agencies involved in 
welfare tasks, and in particularly changes in the nature of 
administrative law. In fact, so far as I know, Luhmann has not 
discussed the latter topic at length. There is something 
suprising about this, given the fact that before entering his 
academic career Luhmann worked as a civil servant, and has 
since clearly indicated in a number of essays ( see especially 
Luhmann 1971) his command of the specialist knowledge required 
to address that topic. In my view, however, the fact that he 
has so far failed to address it is not accidental, but
expresses what one may call a grounded reluctance, and can be
made sense of in the light of following considerations:
a) Luhmann has recently insisted on the distinction between
three fundamental levels at which social systems are formed and 
operate: the interactional; organisational; and societal
level. Law, in his view, develops and functions primarily at 
the last, societal level. For reasons indicated above,
however, the performance of welfare activities is increasingly 
the concern of agencies operating more and more as
organisations, which to that extent are not as likely to
constitute the foci of specifically legal developments as the
"classical" state organs were.
b) It is true of course that the structure of such agencies is 
the proper concern of legislation. However
- Luhmann seems to think that by and large existent 




























































































Republic are adequate (1981a: 115); and, in any case,
- the legislative decisions concerning those structures are, 
strictly speaking, matters of policy, and as such not the 
object of specifically juridical argument.
c) As to the operations of those agencies, these generally take 
the form of "programmed decisions". Luhmann distinguishes two 
kinds of programmes:
- conditional programmes. These state certain conditions, the 
occurence of which bindingly commits agencies to certain 
prearranged lines of activity.
- purposive programms. These assgn to agencies a given task or
goal, leaving them largely free to seek the means most
conducive to its realisation.
Now, only conditional programmes are specifically amenable to 
close juridical orientation and control, and require agencies to 
engage in that specific form of juridical reasoning which 
consists in matching abstractly stated conditions with the 
factual situations (Tatbestaendej at hand. However, such
programmes (with which much of traditional administrative law is 
concerned) are, according Luhmann, increasingly unsuitable for 
the orientation and control of administrative activity in a 
complex, changing environment. But welfare state activities are 
increasingly of the latter kind, and accordingly require
purposive programmes; this makes them relatively resistant to 




























































































d) Besides "conditional programmes", much administrative law sets 
up detailed Verfahren, (decisional procedures). According to 
Luhmann, the key function of Verfahren is that of imparting 
legitimacy to decisions. In his view, however, modern political 
systems - at any rate those constituted as liberal democracies - 
entrust the task of legitimation mainly to the spheres of 
politics and legislation (which perform them respectively through 
the electoral and legislative Verfahren. Thus the administration 
ought to be able to proceed with its own activity without much 
concern for legitimating it (Luhmann, 1975b:ch. 4). This seems 
to me an argument (however implicit) for loosening up many of the 
legal restraints traditionally placed upon the administration, 
leaving it free to develop and execute "purposive programmes" 
which in turn are, as suggested above, relatively free from legal 
regulation.
e) Luhmann forthrightly opposes the prospect, cherished by 
others, of modifying the traditional forms of juridical thinking 
and training by integrating them with conceptual resources and 
research strategies drawn from the social sciences (Luhmann, 
1969; Luhmann, 1973). "Classical" juridical thinking has a 
rationality of its own, focussed on the attachment of correct 
qualifications to past events, the determination of 
responsibility for past acts, and the application of the 
resulting sanctions. Such a rationality is at root incompatible 
with one aimed primarily at the production of future effects; at 
the determination and control of the factual (as against 




























































































two rationalities would compromise the rigour and distinctiveness 
of each, and constitute a form of de-differentiation. Instead, 
modern social sciences should be juxtaposed to legal studies in 
the training of administrative personnel, and the respective 
orientations should concur in orienting administrative action. 
But in this inter-disciplinary programme, the specific content of 
legal studies would remain fairly traditional (Luhmann, 
1970b:73); and they would hold a decreasingly significant 
position with respect to the programme's other components.
f) At bottom, what for Luhmann (as I read him) essentially 
disqualifies law from playing a critical role in activating and 
controlling the ever-expanding activities of public agencies, is 
the fact that contemporary society requires cognitive 
expectations rather than normative ones, to play the decisive 
role in orienting the social process (Luhmann, 1975a:51 ff.). 
Law itself, of course, forms the object of sustained and 
sophisticated cognitive efforts, resulting in knowledge which can 
be systematised, taught, examined, rationally argued about. Yet 
when all is said and done such knowledge refers to expectations 
of a normative nature: that is, expectations, the frustration of 
which by the course of events does not lead to these expectations 
being abandoned or modified, but to their being held 
contrafactually and reasserted by means of sanction (Luhmann, 
1972:40 ff.). It is their ultimate foundation on a refusal to 
learn that condemns bodies of normative expectations to play a 
recessive role in an increasingly complex and changing society. 




























































































juridical knowledge) is accordingly reduced.
Insofar as these several considerations constitute a plausible 
(though admittedly selective, and only partially substantiated) 
rendering of Luhmann's views about law, their bearing on this 
paper's topic seems clear. For Luhmann, administrative action 
(including that which performs the state's multiple welfare 
tasks) must increasingly take place in a juridical vacuum. One 
might go as far as saying that, at least for administrative law 
the ultimate import of Luhmann's thinking on that topic is a kind 
of Abschied vom Recht - leave-taking from law.
I am aware of the contrasting view argued by Teubner in a 
sophisticated paper (Teubner, 1982), which draws on Luhmann (and 
other authors) for the vision of a different kind of law, 
appropriate to the requirements of contemporary society, and in 
particular oriented - to use Luhmann's own terminology - more to 
the "steering of conduct" than to the "securing of expectations" 
(Luhmann, 1974). And of course I realise that Luhmann himself 
could all too easily dispose of my views on the matter by the (to 
him) simple device of addressing in a sustained fashion those 
aspects of this paper's topic which I maintain he has so far 






























































































(1) There are now two volumes of Luhmann's writings 
Luhmann, 1979, 1982.
(2) See Chapter 5 "Positive Law and Ideology", and 
"The Autonomy of the Legal System", in Luhmann, 
introductory presentation (Poggi, 1980) is 
unpublished.
(3) See also Poggi, 1979, Holmes and Larmore, 1982.
(4) Luhmann refers to writings by T.H. Marshall 
Parsons as proximate sources of this concept.
in English:
Chapter 6, 
1982. My own 
as yet
and Talcott
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